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.WIRIC!N FAR WTEJW POLICY.
In the matters or foreisn policy, the Ame~can people are generally
more concerned with the affairs of Europe than with those of Asia .
emphasis is not difficult to understand.
Europeans .

Thie

Most ot us are deecendents of

Our political institutions derive largely from Europe; and

strong economic and cultural bonds link the Oni ted States to that continent.

Perhape most important, the European countries have provided a

powerful thrust in the shaping of recent world
fro~

histo~, . so

that isolation

their influence--for good or for evil--has not been po8sible for ue .

In the years that lie ahead, Europe is likely to remain for a long time
the _rinoipal focus of American concern in foreign affairs .
n .e time has come, however, to give increased coll8ideration to our
POsition and policies in the Far Eaet.

For, while our attention has been

concentrated on Europe, the drive of American civili1ation has been oarrying us steadily westward; first acroea a continent to the Pacific; then
beyond, to the ocean islands; and finally, to the shores of Asia where we
now occupy Japan with a force of more than 100, 000 Americans.
This westward projection of the Onited States is a development tilat
dates from the eerliest days of the Republic .

During most of the 19th

Century, however, it found expression within the
North America in the forging_of the nation.

continen~l

limits of

In the Far East at the time ,

our ajor concern was the safety of our missionaries and the rights o!
our shippers and traders .

Even these limited interests , however, led us

to initiate the opening of Japan by Admiral perry.

After 1900, American interest& in the Pacific began to spread and
multiply.

The recent war, of course , precipitated this process; and today,

we are plunged aore deeply in the Far last than ever before.

There it
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little likelihood that our involvement will diminish in the tutur
indication, that it will increase.

We

re, even at thi

nd every

oaent, consider!

a new Aid-plan for China .
To meet the situntion in which we now find ourselves in the far P oifio,
it is imperative th t we develop end apply intelligent Far Eastern policies .
This is not a sillple assignment.

The region is i1111ense and extre ely complex.

China, Japan, torea , Southern and Southeast Asia--while they oont in anr
factors in common with which we must reckon--also present us with individual
problems of foreign relations .

They are , in effect, separate challenges to

our reaourcefullnese which must be met with aepar te responses .

But even

aore, these specific policies must be devised within the pattern of our
universal foreign polia,y wlich 1 stated generally, is to provide adequstely
for the security of the United States; to preserve world peace; and to
establish mutually beneficial commercial and cultural relations with the
other nations of the world .
•n the remainder of the discussion, I propose to consider briefly thoae
principal sub-divisions of the Far East which I have mentioned
of our relations with each of them.

~nd

the couree

These are the components, the main div-

isions, of what is termed American Far Eastern policy.
China is or major imports.nce .
~

It 18 the country with which we have

intnined the longest, and in some respects , the most significant rolations.

Our Chinese policy has evolved slowly over the course of a century.

Tradi-

tionally, it has bean based on such concepts as the • open Door• and the maintenance of China's

•ind~pendence

was adequate while

con~~ets

and territtrial integrity. • .

This policy

with China were linited nnd •• •ere primarily

interested in the protection of commercial interests .

It was a comparatively

simple and inexpensive policy to operate.
However, the rapid ascendancy or Japan to dominance in

~st

As1

!ter
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orld ·ar I challenged the "Open Door" nnd China's "independence and territorial integrity.•.

FurtherMore. it became increasingly evident--especially

after the invasion of Manchuria in 1931--that not only the business interests
of

A~ericen

nationRls in China were menaced by Japan's actions but the very

security of our country was involved.
Democr~tic

Succeoeive Secretaries of State--in

and RepUblican administrations alike--sought through •arioua meana

to blunt the headlong rush of Japanese sggression and to reassert the traditional pattern of our policy in China.

It was only after the shattering of

this policy that Japan entered irrevocably on the patch ihat led to the War
in the Pacific.
The end of the recent conflict found us more deeply involved in China
than at any other time in history.

With our soldiers atill scattered through-

out Cnina and with continuing commitments to the Central Government, immediate
withdrawal was impossible.

Furthermore our hopes for world peace were based

in part on the belief thnt a strong and independent Chinn could aot as a
s~bilizing

influence in Bust Asia.

But Chinn, exhausted by the war, was on

the verge of economic collapse and in imminent danger of renewed civil war.
Under these

ciroums~~nces,

it was evident that we could not easily

revert to the prewar pattern of our Chine policy.

Elaboration was essential

to meet the new situation and it was forthcoming in a statement by President
Truman on December 16• 1945.

In thio pronouncement, the Preeident called

for a "strong, united and democratic China." He 5aid that the United States
would continue to recognize the Central Goyernment and to cooperate with it
internationally, but thut we would not intervene m111taril7 "to influence tiB
course of any Chinese strife."

In addition, the President held out the promise

of Amerioan aid as the Chinese moved towards peace and unity.
was sent to China to assist in furthering this policy.

General Marshall
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For the y

r th t he served in China, the

ener 1

ought through

i tion to bring about a •Strong, un1 ted end democr ic Chinn. •.

ed-

arshall•

oat determined efforts, however, proved unavniling in the face of t enty
years of mutual hatred, aietrust and suspicion on the part of the Chin se
tuo intang and Co unist lenders.

Our attempts to promote a settlement

earnest us nothing but the ounting hostility of large sections of the warwe ry Chinese people who vented the bitterness of their frustrated hopes
for peace on the pencemakers.
Since General Marshall's return, early in 1947, the United
continued to support Generalissimi

C~iang

tates has

lai-shek'e Government in inter-

national matters, giving him diplomatic backing ugainst

F~ssia

on the repar-

a tiona issue in Manchuria and on the question of restoring Chin se sovereignty in the ei ties of Dairen and Port Arthur .

At the sa.me tiae we haTe

sought, as far as possible to extricate ourselves from the civil war situation.
In other words, the United states had not changed its policy of deairing a
"strong, united and democratic China , " but

Wt!B

awaiting a more propitious

moment for furthering it • .
In recent months, however, the oltuution in China has been growing very
tense.

The position of the Central Government

Production is at a pEactical standstill.
shortages--particularly in the large
ships for the Cbinese people.

h~s

deteriorated very rapidly.

Inflation, speculation nnd food

citiee--h~ve

occaa61oned severe hard-

Inefficiency r;,nd corruption corrode the

chinery of government and incompetent officers and inadequate organication
devitalise the army .
Chinese Communists now hold most of Utmchuria and are becoming stronger
throughout North China .

A massive struggle for power goes on, and the eo

on

people of Chin&, whose strongest yearning is for peace, are steadily crushed
by an .ver -increasing weight of economic chaos and military devastation.

- 5The question, which naturally ari:Jea, is whether or not there is anything

~~~t

can be done to alleviate the sit tion.

there anything we can do?

More e,eeifieally, is

Any attempt to answer U1is question ohould begin

with a consideration of what we have alre dy done.
available loans and grants totaling $3 billion.
has been extended since V-J day.

Sinoe 1937 we have made

Of this a. ount, almost half

In addition, we hnve transferred to the

Chinese at · fraction of cost large quantities of surplus properties including some arms and munitions, and provided a nuoleous o! 271 s•all ships for
the Chinese navy.
There is now under consideration a China equivalent of the E.R.P. which
the State Department estimates will cost $570 million through June 30, 1949.
If the plan is adopted, the Central Government will be given loans and grants,
not for military equipment and sup)lies , but to check the disintegration of
~~e

civilinn economy, to bring some direct relief to the bard-pressed populaoe.

$60

million~!

the total is earmnrked !or the rehabilitation--particularly

of tr nsportation-in

removed from the civil war zones.

nre~a

mi ttal of the program, the :President emphasized that it
e. cure-all !or China • s ill:s.

WRS

In bh trans-

not intended as

In hi a own words, "The proposed program ot aid.

to China represents what I believe to be the beat course this Government can
follow in the light of all the circumstances.

Nothing which this country

provides by way o£ assistance oa.n, even in a sm&ll measure, be a substitute
for the necessary action that can be taken only,ibe Chinese Government.•
The assistance which we are extending through various channels to the
Chinese is not inconsider&ble but there has been, nevertheless, oome
for more •positive" help.

dem~nd

•Pooitive," in this sense, means of course, grants

of guns and ammunition for the Central Government.
However laudatory the objective of fighting Communists may be, let us
examine just two of the many pos ible ramifications of such

~

"positive•

- 6liey.

would

In the first pl ce, we

&lmo~t

uat recoaniz

hon

tly tb t

certainly lead to the return of American troop

ing numbers to Chinese soil.
technicians and ulti

in ever-incr

first as instructors, then as advisors

tely perhaps as combattants .

me reo ll the wide-spread demonstr tions

~gainet

!.d

111te.ry

s-

nd

In tr.ie conn otion, let

the presence of American

troops in China during the late 1946 and early 1947--troop which were there
for the peaceful purpose of attempting to meintain the Nationalistic-Communist truce.

What would be the reaction of the war-weary Cbin ae people if

the function of American soldiers in China were expressly to aosist on
faction in the civil strife agdnst the other?
In the second place, such a program of •positivew aid would flaunt
arrogantly two of the strongest sentiments of the Chinese-n
the desire to'r peace .

.Lt would place

U8

t1on~l1sm

nnd

in the unenviable position which

General Marshall has urged us to avoid--that ian of being ch rged with a direct
responsibility for the conduct ot the Chinese Government and its political,
economic and military affairs . "
If we

•~bark

on such a course, we must be prepared to t&ke on for our-

selves the same heritage of hatred the Russians are constructing for themeelvee in Dairen and Port Arthur.
If we wish to avoid this reaction, we can do little more, at present,
th n to ansist, through whatever peaceful avenues are open to us in the
alleviation of human miaery nnd in checking economic d1eentegrat1on.

e

cannot, however, add to the phycical wreckage and the slaughter or fratricidal
atrife and expect to bo thanked for our troUble.
In contrast with China, where our course is deteroined by ourselves
along on the basis of n long historical experience, the pattern of the
American occup tion of Japan deriveo fror. inter-Allied &greement and constitutes a new raaification in our Far Eastern policy.
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The broad aim of the Occupation is to insuro
peaceful,
ste bl~

de~oeratic

world.

~n

m~jor Allie~.

of Japan.

Japan, able and willing to cooperate in building e

the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945, adhered to b,y
They include the full demilitarization and democratization

They do not include the

people or the

establishment of a

The means by which we propose to bring this change about were

sta ted broadly
the

th~

tot~l deet~ot..o

erm~nent ensl~vement

of the Japanese

of the Jspaneee industrial economy.

In the creation of machinery to carry out the purposes of the Occupation,
the United States

~ought

to preserve the leadership which·we hnd exercised

throughout the war in the racific and, at the same time, to give adequate
recognition to the interests of the other A!liea who participated in the
struggle.

The appointment of Generg,l MacArthur as Supreme Co'Ulllander of the

Allied Powers--of SCAP as it is abbreviated--to accept the surrender, insured
the continuity of our primary war poaition into the Peace.

Our

~llies

share

in the occupation through nn Allied advisory body which works with General
a cArthur in Tokyo and through an eleven-member Far Eastern Commission which
meets here in Washington.
p~tion

The latter body

h~s

authority to formulate occu-

policy, but its powers are circumscribed in such a manner as to in-

sure the eontinuP.nce of the dominant influence of the Oni ted SVJ.tes in both
policy formulation and execution.
Thjs primacy, however, carries with it corresponding responsibilitiee,

heavy, both in terms of eostr. and effort and in terms of the future peace
of the P oi!io.

It is incumbent upon

UG

to attempt to transform a

feud~l

Japan into a new State capable of pe ceful nnd progressive eurviwal in the
modern world.

The basic measures through whi ch we hope to carry out this

re3ponsibil1ty--that is, the SCAP directives, deeigned to work far-reaching
changes in the military,
eoclety--have been

politic~l,

pro~ulgated.

Our

economic and social structure of Japnneee
~njor re~ining

task io to see thet they
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are carried out.
The greatest progress in implementAtion i
of demilitarization.

discerneble in t..
~ar

Japan's capacity to wage

field

has been practically

obliterated through tile physical destruction of military mc.terial; the de obiliz~tion

of the armed forces; the purge from public life and in some c Des,

the criminal triel, of

w~r

leadftrs.

Political reform in Japan has

m~de

considerable gains.

A new con-

stitution 1s now in operation, embodying n very liberal "Bill of Riehta".
It establishes a oound legal basis upon which
can bo constructed.

.~

genuine de ooratic government

An interesting feature of the Constitution ie the renun-

ciation by Japan of tile right to maintain either an Army or Navy.
SCft%'s economic directives nre

de~igned

to break up

exces~ive

tratione of power and to diversify the control of Japan's wealth.

coneeneasures

have been introduced to eliminate the monopolies of the Zaibatsu--the great
family trusts, and to

spre~d

the ownership of land and industry,

Both

trade unionism nnd agricultural cooperatives have been encouraged and h ve
experienced a phenomenal growth.
These measures, h. .ever, are not
ing Jnpan.
roughly

nde~uate

With 1"- population of,. million now compressed into an rea

e~ual

in size to Montana nnd fttr less opulent, Japan must develop s.

slbstantial foreign trade or remain a permanent
While SCAP is making determined efforts to
problem is tn
FarE stern

to establish a self-support-

extre~ely

Co~~ission

difficult one.

o~rge

incre~se

on the United S tatee.

Japaneae exports,

~~e

Many of the Allied members of the

fear the oocpetition of Jap n's industry

bro d, par-

ticularly in textiles; there are unsettled demands for reparations which leave
the Japanese uncertain ss to which lines of production to develop; and
finally, the de::l:.lnd for the moct importnnt Japanese export--raw sillt-h s
been drastically curtailed by the growth in the world-use of synthetics.

- 9It may be that thf! genuine rehnbilitntion of tho e:x.port trade must nweit
the signing of n jJeacc treP-t •

This evAnt, however, could be long delayed.

On July 11, 194'7, the United Stutes proposed a conference of the membarB of
the

F~tr

.En.stern Cotll!lis:.>ion to di8cuss the terns of a pence settler:ent.

Rus.tia hss denounced the lrocedure proposed nnd Chinn h

But

exprecsec some

.!?

reservations.
In the field of soci-1 reforn, the moat
seek extensive redirection of
Shintoi~--that

Ja~nese educ~tion;

ti~e

the Diet for the first

~ght

been

fir~ly

the abolition of State

mention thnt women have bAen elected to

in Japanese history.

To all outward ap•enrances, tl1e Anericnn
grant success.

OCAP directiveg

is eoperor worship; end the equalizing of the gtatus of women.

With respect to the latter, I

a

im:10r~nt

The

foundations for

esUlblished.

While the

!1.

oceup~tion

of J pan

h~~

been

pe::tceful a nd rle.nocra.tia Japan have

Jap~nese

give every

indic~tion

of approv-

ing the many changes introduced, there is no accurate me sure for determining how deep-seated their

acc~ptnnce

hao been.

In the long run, whether democracy flourishes in Jspan depends upon
the Japanese people thenselves, on the one hrmd, and the United
the United Nations on th" other.

The former must der.1onstrete the eternal

vigilence so e3Jential to the preservation of a free society.
we must end the occupation as quic..d:r es :?0!3sible and then
ful

su~ervision

tates ond

For ourselves,

;~inbin P.

care-

over Japen to prevent a recrudescence of a militArism which

might once again be turned upon ua.

At the 5'!!11e time, we must continue .

together with the other United Nations, to str!Te for the sort of world in
which Japan osn

~rovide

itoelf with decent living ntandards

~~rough

normal

trade; a nd unarmed, ntand es a symbol of the cau city of the United Nations

to preserve pence, r ther thl\n ae an open invitation to invasion
aggressors

by
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Our occupation o! [orea may best be described as a reluctant one.
entered the southern half of the country at the conclusion of the

r to diw-

arm the Japanese forces there and to provide an interim admini tr tion.
the same time, the Rus6ians advanced into the north.

t

The 38th p rallel

I

latitude was intended as e temporary, convenient line or division, firs or
military end then of temporary administrative reftponsibilities.

We hoped

thAt a provisional, all-Korean government could be established quickly and
that, in due course, *h' full independence o! Korea would follow.

But for

two and a half years , the Korean people have waited !or the promiaed independence or at least a unified provisional Government.
neither.

They have received

Instead, they have witnessed the militney division of their country

grow into a rigid political partition.

The economic effects of the cl v ge

at the JSth parallel have been catastrophic .

The equalibrium between the

industrial north and the agr:cultural south hga been distorted;

~nd

Korea,

which as a unit, could be reasonably self-supporting, now finds itsolf cut
into two insufficient segments .

The

da~Re

is probably more severe in the

American zone, since the normal population there has been swelled by en
influx of several million refugees from the north and from Japan.
For two yeP.rs the United states adhered to a policy of se king the tmmediate breakdown of the unnaturel economic barrier through the middle of the
country, nnd of promoting a u!Ufied, democratic, !11-Korenn goTernment.

Vur

efforts , in both instances, were completely blocked by the Soviet Union.
Russians sealed themselves within

~~eir

The

zone nnd frustrcted negotiations on

the formation of an interim government by refusing to consider the inclusion
in it of any Korean

litical groups other than those approved by the

In the fnll of 1947, the United

Co~unist1 .

tates admitted, in effect, that

bilateral negotiations with the Ruagiana could

t~t

solve the Korean dilemma

when it requested U1e U. N. Assembly to cotsider the proble3.

Over strong

- 12
Soviet opposition, the United Nations dispatched

Commission to

~rea

with

a view to supervising the holding of elections in both zones preliminary

to the formation of a unified government. The Conmission was welcomed in
the South.

Its request to enter the r orth

wt~.s

ignored.

Inst4Jad, the auth-

ority of the U. N. body was flaunted by the Co1JII'llunista who were reported to
be forming in the Northern Zone an •all-lorean People's Republic . •
The Oni ted States is also considering the formation of a separate
government in the Southern aone .

the arguments in favor of the plan are

besed in part on the contention th t since the

outh contains two thirds ot

the population, a government for tbe area would have a strong legal basis
for claiming to represent the entire country.

A majority of the members

of the United Nations Commission on Korea, however, do not believe that
such a step at this time would contribute to the unity or independence of
the Korean people, but, nevertheless , the Little Assembly has ordered the
Com ission to supervise elections in the south .
The United Staten aust fnoe the fact that if the Russians withdr w
their occupation forces in accordance with their announced intention, there
will be left behind a well-organised North Korean communist government and
a large, communist-dominated army.
extremely eri tical.
while

~waiting

Our poai tion in the South then would be

To continue the status-quo of mili tart adminbtra tion

a possible all-Korean solution might well provoke the hostility

of the Korean people.

The Korean communiets undoubtedly will point out that

si&ee Russia hae withdrawn, only imperialiet America stands in the way of
full independence and eelf-government.

lfe have no right to asl'!ume that the

Koreans in the South ore leas likely to accept this explanation of the situa tion than our own.
On the other hand, we may withdraw our forces at once .

In that c ae ,

the well-organised and armed minority in the north could probably seiee con-

- 13 trol of the South and destroy the possibilities of forming a genuine de ocratic Government.
The other alternative 1

to proceed

a representative government in the South.

immediate~

with the formation of

We should be aw re before we

initiate such a government however, of what the undert_king entails if it is

to

be

more than a 11ere gesture.

It would mean, first of all, econonrl.c

assistance on a far greater scale than the present "disease and unrest"
appropriations.

Unless the economic ills are corrected

~nd

the area is

rendered reasonably self-sufficient, the existence ot a South Korean goveruaaaD would depend upon American mUi tary backing.

In addition, firm ste}W

will have to be taken to root our the corruption which has seeped into the
(orean civil service and to end the free reign of
terrorism which has already

ol~imed

extre~e

rightist nd leftist

the lives of two outstanding moderate

leaders by assaaaination.
In sharp contrast to the ohaoa and instability which extends over so
much of Asia and the Far last , the Philippines are far advanced in inteunal
rehabilitation and have achieved a distinct and independent p
national society .

e in inter-

Iet a year and a half ago, on July 4, 1946, when the

independence of the Islands was proclaimed, there were many who
the wisdom of the act.

~ueetioned

The Philippines had been burned and gutted by some

of the most intense combat of the entire war.
ruins .

Production was at a st!mdstill.

down in

aa~

Law

Many of itA cities were in
l!.nd

order had largely broken

sections of the country.

In the faee ot these multiple obstacles, the Philippines have staged
co
• It is significant that this year a balanced budget
a magnifi oen t recoovery
has been achieved and the largest ite= is tor education. The gre t measure
of credit for this co ebaok, of course, is due to the Philipino people. t . ey
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have demonstrated a capacity for persistent, constructive endeavor under
their own leadership.

But some amnll part of it is due, perhaps, to the

cooperative policy which we are

followin~

with respect to the Islands .

This policy, a natural outgrowth of our 48-year relationship with the
Philip~inee

and the deep sympathetic interest of the

A~eriean

people in

their welfare, has been given a number of tangible expressions.

Various

legislation has been passed by the Congress approprie.ting more than halfa-billion

doll~rs

for reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Considerable

quantities of surplus property has been transferred to the Philippines; and
a preferential trade act was passed by the previous Congress which will
permit a gradual transition of the Philippine

to a more balanced economy.

The policy of cooperation with the Philippines is a long- term one.
It extends into the international field , where we are •orking together
through a military base agreement to provide for our mutual security and
in the Oni ted Na tiona for the peace end general well-being of the world.
The fact that our policy of cooperation led to the successful launching of the Philippines as an independent

S~~te

has had its profoundest re-

percussions in the last section of tbe Far East whict I shall consider-'outhern and South-eastern Asia.
This vast rich nrea of many races and more than half a billion

h~an

beings, is, in the fullest sense, the frontier of our Far Eastern Policy.
Prior to World War I we had few contacts of a01 kind with the region; and
even up until the outbreak of the recent conflict our major concern was with
certain key commodities such as petroleum, rubber, tin, and quinine, important both to our domestic econonsy and to world tr&.de in general.

Poli t.

leal control of the area was largely in the hands of the European colonial
powers and we did not ouestion the arrangements .

-15 However, the needs of the war witb J pan
day hnvo compelled a more c retul conside

nd develo

enta

inoe

tion or our relation

v-J

thSouthern

and Southeast Asia.
A base tor our policy w1 th the are waa established by Cordell Bull
on March 21, 1944.

The

eoretary or otate declareda

"There rests upon the independent nations ft
in regard to 'dependent peoples' who
aspire to liberty. It should be the duty of na.tiona
rAving political ties with nuoh
ople ••• to h lp the
aspiring peoples to develop
terially and educationAll1
to pre~re themselves for the duties and renponn1b1l1ties or self-government, and to attain liberty.'
re~poneibility

Since the end or the wnr, we have in general sought to exp nd this bllae, without however, challenging directly the uihority or the Colonial Powers who
exercise legal aovereillltY in various of the territories.

This policy hae

been expressed primarily through full cooperation with those apeoialized and
su&sidiar,y

u.

N. agencies concerned with the econoaic and social bettarment

of the region. An interesting development bAs been the

nego~iation

of a

nUIPer of 8ir-transport agreements which permit ou• irlines to link the
great cities o!
In

~outhern

politic~l

and .;>outheast Asia with our own for the first time.

matters, our policy has been extremely cautious.

those countries whoetdindependence is of long-standing or far

With

dvanoed

~~rough

constitutional rocesses, we are, at present, eetabliahing ore intimate
And cordial relations.

Thus, in the ease or Siam, Nepal, Burm , India and

Pakistan, cultural and. coMeroial contncta are

bein~

enlarged.

1re nre faced with difficult deoinione of policy in bo Southeast
Asisn countries--Indo Chin and Indonesia.
into r volt

ag~inat

the return of the

Both of these res htv fl red

~rewar

colonial powers.

we sought to nsintain a policy of non-involvement.

However,

particularly in the case ot Indoneda, soon bee me illlpossible.

t first

uch
A eric n
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equipment tr nr.ferred originally for

u:~e

in the war gainst Japan, was being

used by the Dutt.h against the Indonesiens in an effort to reotore their
aut~ority.

Furthermore, the conflict was of large comp ss and seriously

impaired the flow of critically ne ded r w materials.

Most significant

in the long run perhaps, was the open manifestation of sympathy for the
Republican cause on the part of many neighboring countries, particularly
India, the Philippines and ustralia.

These nations were cloaely watching

our attitude with respect to the Indonesian situation.
In devising policies to meet the situation the United States has had
to consider our rela tionsbip with the betherlands and the importnnce of that

country in Western Europe.

At the same time it h&s been

to ignore the rising tide of nationalism in the East.
stanoes, a middle course has been attempted.

~mpossible

Under the

for

u~

ciro~

We have acknowledged the

Justice of Indonesian aspirations for freedom but have urged a pacific
settlement of the dispute which would protect legitimate Dutch interest••
It is still too early to determine how suocesaful tbie policy has been
since the entire question is before the Security Council of the United
Nations.
In our relations with all the areas which I have considered, a oommon
thece is evident.

We are seeking, in general, the gradual evolution of

peaveful , stable and democratic societies in the ll'ar Jloast and the maintenance with them of friendly and mutually advantageous relations.

In a broader

aspect, we want these countries to be economically and politioallf capable
of sharing with us and with other nations the reepon3ibilit1es or building
a secure and prosperous world society.
The course which we have set for ourselves in the l'ar -Cast ie essentially a cooperative one and it takes into consideration the dignity and
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rights of the peoples with whom we come into contact.
course to follow.

It i

not an o sy

The going will become even more difficult e.s our involv-

ements deepen but we must persist in it.

To do ao will require patience in

tbe face o! mnny problems and provocations.

e must reconcile the cours

o!

cooperation with the legitimate security needs of the United St tea in the
.Fnr East.

We 11ust harmonize 1 t 11. th our policies in other pnrts of the world .

We must defend it from opponents both inside and outside the United
States.

But we munt, £•t all costs, follow the we.y of coopern tion not only in
Asia and the Far East, but everywhere in the world.
are imperialism or isolationism.

The only lternativee

Imperialism ia abhorrent to every premise

upon which our free societr stands.

Isolationism becomes , at best, extremely

perilous when we are scarcely 24-hours airtime distence from Tokyo, Hong
Kong or Manila .

